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Has Family Leave Legislation Increased  
Leave-Taking? 
Charles L. Baum* 
ABSTRACT 
In 1993, the federal government passed the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), which gives eligible employees twelve weeks of 
job-protected unpaid leave from work per year to address family 
issues.1 Employees are eligible for family leave under the FMLA if 
they have worked for their employer for at least a year, accumulating 
at least 1,250 work hours.2 Employers are covered if they employ at 
least fifty workers.3 Prior to the FMLA’s passage, twelve states and 
the District of Columbia had passed their own family leave 
legislation mandating similar benefits.4 One potential use of family 
leave legislation is to give mothers leave from work after giving 
birth. One potential use of this legislation is to allow mothers leave 
from work after giving birth. In this Article, I estimate the effects of 
family leave legislation on mothers’ leave-taking after giving birth. I 
examine the effects of family leave legislation as a natural 
 * Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and Finance, Middle 
Tennessee State University. 
 1. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000); see also Suzanne M. Crampton & Jitendra M. Mishra, 
Family and Medical Leave Legislation: Organizational Policies and Strategies, 24 PUB. 
PERSONNEL MGMT. 271, 272 (1995). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 3. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2000). 
 4. See BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT: THE COMPLETE 
HANDBOOK ON DISCRIMINATION, MATERNITY LEAVE, AND HEALTH AND SAFETY (1987); 
WOMEN’S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS GUARANTEEING 
EMPLOYEES THEIR JOBS AFTER FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE (1994); Jacob A. Klerman & 
Arleen Leibowitz, Labor Supply Effects of State Maternity Leave Legislation, in GENDER AND 
FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 65–85 (Francine D. Blau & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 
1997). 
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experiment because state family leave laws (passed prior to the 
FMLA) vary both in scope and in dates of enforcement. I also 
identify the mothers who have the employment history to be eligible 
for the mandated leave benefits and who work for employers of 
sufficient size to be covered by their state’s legislation. My results 
suggest that family leave legislation has had little effect on leave-
taking. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The FMLA was not initially met with universal approval—it was 
vetoed twice by President George H.W. Bush, but signed into law by 
President Clinton. Today, ten years after the legislation went in to 
effect, reviews are still mixed. Some feel that the FMLA has imposed 
upon employers the costly administrative burden of tracking who is 
eligible for leave from work.5 Another criticism is that employees 
take leave from work for illnesses that are not necessarily covered by 
the legislation, such as “pink eye, sprained ankles, and the common 
cold.”6 Conversely, others view the FMLA as beneficial and are 
calling for extensions to the legislation. For example, in 2004, 
California will become the first state to mandate paid family leave 
benefits.7 Specifically, California will require employers to provide 
six weeks of paid leave; workers on leave will receive up to fifty-five 
percent of what they would otherwise earn, with a maximum 
payment of $728 per week.8 Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd is 
currently drafting legislation that would provide federal financial 
support to states that mandate paid family leave.9 His proposed 
legislation would also lower the coverage threshold to employers 
with at least twenty-five employees.10  
 5. See, e.g., Shawn Smith, Ten Years Old, the FMLA Still Poses Complications, 42 
FAIRFIELD COUNTY BUS. J. 4 (2003). 
 6. Happy Birthday FMLA! You Need an Overhaul, EXECUTIVE’S TAX & MGMT. REP., 
May 7, 2003, at 11 (quoting Susan Meisinger, Society for Human Resource Management 
President and CEO). 
 7. Tom Klett, Challenges Loom from California’s Paid Family Leave, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT NEWS, July 1, 2003, at 35. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 39. 
 10. Jerry Geisel, Bill to Expand FMLA Introduced in Senate, 37 BUS. INS. 27, 15 (Feb. 10, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/5
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To determine if extensions or reductions in government-mandated 
family leave benefits are warranted, one must first understand the 
effects of the current provisions. One important potential effect of 
family leave legislation is its impact on the incidence of maternal 
leave-taking after giving birth, and on the duration of the maternity 
leave taken. Family leave legislation could cause employers who 
previously provided no leave benefits to offer family leave for the 
first time, granting some mothers leave from work who were 
previously allowed none. Similarly, family leave legislation could 
require employers to change existing policies, allowing some mothers 
to take longer periods of leave. Conversely, family leave legislation 
might not have substantial effects on family leave if many employers 
already offered sufficient leave prior to the passage of family leave 
legislation. Additionally, family leave legislation might not affect 
maternity leave for mothers who are not eligible for or covered by the 
legislation because they have an insufficient tenure or their employer 
is too small. Further, since the mandated leave is unpaid, many 
mothers may not wish to use the mandated leave benefits due to 
financial constraints. 
In this Article, I estimate the effects of family leave legislation on 
the probability that mothers take maternity leave after giving birth 
and on the weeks of maternity leave mothers take,11 using National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data.12 Because the NLSY 
identifies each respondent’s state of residence, I could determine 
whether each mother lived in a state at a time when family leave 
legislation was in force. I studied the effects of family leave 
legislation as a natural experiment, which is possible because state 
family leave laws passed prior to the FMLA vary both in scope and 
in dates of enforcement.13 Technically, I compared mothers who give 
2003). 
 11. The scope of this Article is limited to state family leave legislation passed prior to the 
FMLA (1993). 
 12. CENTER FOR HUMAN RESOURCE RESEARCH, NLSY79 USER’S GUIDE (2001) 
[hereinafter NLSY79 USER’S GUIDE]. 
 13. For example, in 1992, California passed legislation mandating seventeen weeks of 
unpaid family leave, and in 1990, Connecticut passed legislation mandating twelve weeks of 
unpaid family leave. Klerman & Leibowitz, supra note 4. Similarly, between 1972 and the 
enforcement date of the FMLA, Maine, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia passed 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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birth in states at times with mandated family leave benefits with 
mothers who give birth in states without family leave legislation. 
Then, I re-estimated the models identifying the mothers who have the 
work history to be eligible for the mandated leave benefits and who 
work for employers of sufficient size to be covered by their state’s 
legislation. My results suggest that family leave legislation has no 
effect on the incidence of leave-taking. There is some evidence that 
such legislation increases the number of weeks of maternity leave 
taken, however, even where statistically significant, the effects of the 
legislation are small. 
Existing evidence is presented in Part II, the empirical approach is 
outlined in Part III, the data is described in Part IV, and the results are 
presented in Part V.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Only a few studies using multivariate regression analysis have 
examined the effects of family leave legislation in the United States.14 
While other research has analyzed the effects of government-
mandated leave in Europe,15 the results from these studies may not 
characterize the effects of family leave legislation in the United 
States, because European mandates provide significantly longer leave 
and a financial stipend.16  
family leave provisions mandating between six and sixteen weeks of family leave. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Charles L. Baum, II, The Effects of Maternity Leave Legislation on Mothers’ 
Labor Supply after Childbirth, 69 S. ECON. J. 772 (2003) [hereinafter Mothers’ Labor Supply]; 
Charles L. Baum, II, The Effect of State Maternity Leave Legislation and the 1993 Family and 
Medical Leave Act on Employment and Wages, 10 LAB. ECON. 573 (2003) [hereinafter 
Employment and Wages]; Klerman & Leibowitz, supra note 4; Joane Waldfogel, The Impact of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281 (1999). 
 15. See Christopher Ruhm & Jackaueline L. Teague, Parental Leave Policies in Europe 
and North America, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 133–57 (Francine D. 
Blau & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997); Christopher Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of 
Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons from Europe, 113 Q.J. ECON. 285 (1998); C.R. Winegarden 
& Paula M. Bracy, Demographic Consequences of Maternal Leave Programs in Industrial 
Countries: Evidence from Fixed-Effects Models, 61 S. ECON. J. 1020 (1995); J. Ondrich et al., 
Full Time or Part Time? German Parental Leave Policy and the Return to Work after Childbirth 
in Germany (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington University Journal of 
Law & Policy). 
 16. For a summary of European family leave provisions, see Ruhm, supra note 15, at 297. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/5
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Examining United States Census data from 1980 and 1990, 
Klerman and Leibowitz estimated the effects of state family leave 
legislation on mothers’ employment status.17 Their results are 
sensitive to their model’s specification, with the effects of family 
leave legislation changing when different sets of covariates are 
included.18 If anything, their preferred results showed that state 
maternity leave legislation has not significantly affected whether a 
mother is employed, working, or on leave.19  
Using descriptive statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Employee Benefits Survey and the 1994 Westat survey, Waldfogel 
found that the amount of family leave allowed by firms increased 
after the FMLA’s passage.20 For example, two-thirds of employers 
reported changing their leave policies to meet FMLA requirements.21 
Using Current Population Survey data, Waldfogel found that the 
FMLA has had a small, positive effect on leave-taking among 
employees of medium sized firms (with 100 to 499 employees) but 
no effect on employees of large firms (500 or more employees).22 
Further, her results showed no significant effects on employment and 
wages.23 
In two studies that use NLSY data, Baum examined the effects of 
family leave legislation on the probability and timing of mothers 
returning to work at their pre-childbirth jobs and on employment and 
wages for women of childbearing age.24 Baum found that family 
leave legislation increases the number of mothers who eventually 
return to their pre-childbirth jobs, and allows such mothers to delay 
their return by several weeks.25 Baum believed this occurs primarily 
because some mothers who would have gotten a new job after giving 
birth can return to their old employer instead.26 Consequently, Baum 
 17. Klerman & Leibowitz, supra note 4. 
 18. Id. at 81. 
 19. Id. at 82. 
 20. Waldfogel, supra note 14, at 285. 
 21. Id. at 285–88. 
 22. Id. at 274. 
 23. Id. at 296–99. 
 24. See Mother’s Labor Supply, supra note 14; Employment and Wages, supra note 14. 
 25. Mother’s Labor Supply, supra note 14, at 793–96. 
 26. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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found that family leave legislation has not affected overall 
employment levels or wages among women of childbearing age.27 
The existing literature has shortcomings. First, because much of 
the literature uses cross-sectional data instead of panel data, it is only 
able to determine family leave legislation’s effect at a particular point 
in time, such as family leave legislation’s effect on employment at 
the time of the survey. For example, these studies are unable to 
examine family leave legislation’s effect on the amount of maternity 
leave taken over the initial weeks after giving birth. Additionally, 
much of the literature fails to determine whether mothers have the 
requisite work history to be eligible for government-mandated family 
leave and whether mothers work for employers of sufficient size to 
be covered by the mandates.28 This is important because many 
mothers who live in states where family leave legislation is in force 
do not actually have access to the mandated maternity leave because 
they do not have the appropriate tenure or they work for employers 
who employ too few employees.  
III. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
I identified the effects of family leave legislation on maternity 
leave with variation in state family leave laws. This was feasible 
because some states passed family leave legislation prior to the 1993 
FMLA while others did not.29 Furthermore, the states that did pass 
family leave mandates did so at different times. Table 1 lists the 
states that passed leave legislation prior to 1993, as well as the 
characteristics of each state’s legislation.30 Thus, I compared women 
 27. Employment and Wages, supra note 14. 
 28. Waldfogel looks at firm size, but not the employee’s work history. See Waldfogel, 
supra note 14. 
 29. In particular, California, Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of 
Columbia passed family leave legislation prior to the 1993 FMLA. Klerman & Leibowitz, 
supra note 4. 
 30. Although the Women’s Defense Fund lists twenty-three states as having family leave 
laws as of 1993, I considered several of those states’ leave legislation to be non-binding for 
private employers and set the family leave legislation variable equal to zero for observations in 
those states. WOMEN’S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 4. Additionally, I believe Klerman & 
Leibowitz did not include all relevant states, thus Table 1’s list of states is in agreement with 
those used by Waldfogel. See Waldfogel, supra note 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/5
p115 Baum book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Increased Leave-Taking? 99 
 
 
who lived in states at times when family leave legislation is in force 
with women who lived in states without family leave legislation.  
TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE AND FEDERAL FAMILY 
LEAVE LEGISLATION 
State 
 
Weeks 
of 
Leave 
Employer 
Size 
Tenure 
Required
Date of 
Enforcement
Work 
Requirement 
Californiaa 17 No Minimum 1 year 1/92 No Minimum 
Connecticutb 12 75 employees 1 year 7/90 1000 hrs in prior yr.
D.C. 16 50 employees 1 year 4/91 1000 hrs in prior yr.
Federal FMLA 12 50 employees 1 year 7/93 1250 hrs in prior yr.
Maine  8 25 employees 1 year 4/88 No minimum 
Minnesota 6 21 employees 1 year 7/87 20 hrs per week 
Massachusetts 8 6 employees 3 months 10/72 Full-time 
New Jersey 12 75 employees 1 year 4/90 1000 hrs in prior yr.
Oregon 12 25 employees 90 days 1/88 No minimum 
Rhode Island 13 50 employees 1 year 7/87 Full-time 
Tennessee 16 100 employees 1year 1/88 Full-time 
Vermont 12 10 employees 1 year 7/92 30 hrs per week 
Washingtonc 12 100 employees 1 year 9/89 35 hours per week 
Wisconsin 6 50 employees 1 year 4/88 1000 hrs in prior yr.
a. California passed legislation mandating leave for disability in 1980.  
b. Connecticut passed legislation mandating leave for disability in 1973.  
c. Washington passed legislation mandating leave for disability in 1973. 
 
However, comparing mothers in states with and without family 
leave legislation will produce misleading results if differences in the 
amount of leave taken between the two groups are due to time-
invariant, state-specific effects that are not the result of the 
legislation. For example, if states that passed family leave legislation 
have mothers who already took more maternity leave from work prior 
to the legislation, then greater leave-taking would spuriously appear 
due to the legislation. To control for such effects, I included state-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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specific dummy variables. Similarly, estimates will be biased if the 
passage of family leave legislation over time is correlated with but 
not due to time trends. For example, if leave-taking among mothers 
would have increased over time in the absence of any family leave 
legislation (perhaps as more women have entered the labor force), 
then increased maternity leave-taking will spuriously appear due to 
family leave legislation. To control for time trends, I included year-
specific dummy variables for each year covered by the model. This 
produced a difference-in-difference (DD) model given by:  
Yi = α0 + α1Xi + α2(stateij) + α3(yearit) + α4(family leave legislation) + εi(1)31 
Unfortunately, the family leave legislation variable will pick up 
all state-specific, year-specific effects including the effect of the 
legislation without a control group from each state for whom family 
leave legislation has no effect. Therefore, for each state, regardless of 
whether that state passed its own legislation, I included a “treatment” 
group affected by family leave legislation and a “control” group not 
affected by the legislation. Then, I compared a treatment group and a 
control group in each state that had family leave legislation with a 
treatment group and control group in each state that did not have 
family leave legislation.32 This produced a difference-in-difference-
in-difference (DDD) estimator that provided unbiased effects of 
family leave legislation, assuming there were no contemporaneous 
shocks that are correlated with but not due to family leave legislation, 
which affect only the treatment group in states with family leave 
mandates.  
 31. For observation i in state j in year t, where Y is the dependant variable (a measure of 
maternity leave-taking), X is explanatory variables (such as demographic characteristics), statej 
is state dummy variables (statej equals 1 if individual i lives in state j), yeart is year-specific 
dummy variables (yeart equals 1 if individual i is in year t), and family leave legislation equals 
1 if government-mandated family leave is in force for individual i in state j at time t. In this 
specification, α4 is the effect of the family leave legislation on leave taking. 
 32. This follows the methodology of Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health-
Insurance Availability and the Retirement Decision, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 938 (1995), Jonathan 
Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622–41 (1994) 
[hereinafter Incidence]; Ruhm, supra note 15; Jonathan Gruber, The Efficiency of a Group-
Specific Mandated Benefit: Evidence from Health Insurance Benefits for Maternity (1992) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/5
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In the DDD portion of the analysis, I used three treatment groups. 
The first group was “eligible” mothers, defined as mothers with the 
requisite work history to be eligible for the mandated family leave. 
The second group was “covered” mothers, defined as those who work 
for employers with the requisite number of employees to be covered 
by the family leave legislation. The third treatment group was 
“eligible and covered” mothers, defined as eligible mothers working 
for covered employers. I expected family leave legislation to have its 
strongest effect on the third group. The corresponding control groups 
were comprised of ineligible mothers, mothers who work for 
employers not covered by the legislation, and ineligible and 
noncovered mothers, respectively.  
The regression specification Gruber33 and Waldfogel used is:34  
Yi = α1 + α2Xi + α3(stateij) + α4(yearit) + α5(stateij*yearit) + α6(family leave 
legislationi) + ε2(2)35 
IV. DATA 
I used NLSY data to estimate family leave legislation’s effects on 
mothers’ leave-taking.36 First, I selected women who gave birth from 
1988 to 1993.37 From this group, I excluded observations that did not 
provide the requisite information to be used in the estimation. I also 
excluded mothers who were not employed before giving birth, as 
they were not expected to take any maternity leave from work.38 This 
 33. Incidence, supra note 32. 
 34. Waldfogel, supra note 14. 
 35. For observation i in state j in year t, where Y, X, statej, yeart, and family leave 
legislation are as defined above and statej*yeart is state-specific year-specific interaction terms 
controlling for state-specific time trends. In this specification, α6 picks up the effect of family 
leave legislation on leave-taking. 
 36. See NLSY79 USER’S GUIDE, supra note 12, at 3. Beginning in 1979, the NLSY began 
collecting yearly information on the labor market experiences and background characteristics of 
people who were between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one in 1979; the survey remains in 
progress. The original NLSY sample contained 6,283 women and an oversample of blacks, 
Hispanics, low-income whites, and military personnel. Id. The military sample was dropped in 
1984 and the low-income white sample was dropped in 1990, thus I did not include respondents 
from either sample. Id. at 24. 
 37. I only included births for which there is sufficient data to determine the mother’s 
employment status in the first several months after giving birth. 
 38. I considered mothers to be employed prior to giving birth if they worked for an 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p115 Baum book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 15:93 
 
 
 
left 2,877 births from 2,180 mothers to be included in my sample. I 
controlled for correlation among observations that come from the 
same respondent because such observations are not independent from 
one another.39  
The NLSY collects extensive information on each mother’s 
employment status, which enabled me to identify whether she was 
employed during each week after giving birth.40 The NLSY also 
identifies unpaid gaps in employment when the individual was 
employed but not working, due to maternity leave.41 However, prior 
to the 1988 survey, it was not possible to identify whether employed 
respondents were actually working or on paid leave.42 This 
distinction is important because many mothers who are employed 
after giving birth are not actually working but instead are on leave. 
Fortunately, beginning with the 1988 survey, the main NLSY 
questionnaire began identifying whether employed mothers were 
working or on paid leave.43 Thus, I only included children who were 
born after 1987 in my sample, in order to identify paid maternity 
leave. Unfortunately, after the 1994 survey, the NLSY stopped 
interviewing respondents annually, and began interviewing 
biennially.44 Although the work history file continues to track 
respondents on a weekly basis, biennial year-long gaps began which 
made it impossible to identify paid leave. Therefore, my sample only 
contains births during the 1988 through 1993 surveys. When 
weighted, my sample is a nationally representative sample of children 
born between 1988 and 1993 to mothers who were between the ages 
of 23 and 30 in 1988.45 
employer within three months before giving birth. Three months was chosen because it is 
within this period that most working pregnant women from my sample stop working. 
 39. This is done using the “cluster” command in STATA. This command relaxes the 
assumption of error independence between observations from the same person, instead defining 
an error structure where only errors between observations with different people are 
independent. Without controlling for such correlation, results would lead to underestimated 
standard errors and overestimated significance levels. 
 40. NLSY79 USER’S GUIDE, supra note 12, at 296. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 267. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 22. 
 45. This sample is limited in that mothers younger than twenty-three and older than thirty-
five who could be affected by the legislation are not represented in my sample. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/5
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Using the work history described above, I identified the amount of 
maternity leave each mother took from work after giving birth. 
Specifically, I created three dependent variables that reflect various 
aspects of mothers’ leave-taking: (1) A variable indicating whether 
each mother took any maternity leave from work after giving birth; 
(2) The number of weeks of leave taken (including zero values); and 
(3) The number of weeks of leave taken among mothers who took 
leave.46 Almost thirty-nine percent of the mothers in my sample took 
maternity leave, with the average duration of leave taken being 3.331 
weeks (or 8.611 weeks among leave-takers). The statistics in Table 2 
also indicate that the incidence of leave taking is positively correlated 
with family leave legislation: 44.9% of mothers with government-
mandated family leave benefits take maternity leave from work, 
compared to 37.7% of mothers without family leave legislation. 
Similarly, mothers with family leave mandates take an average of 
4.197 weeks of maternity leave, compared to 3.197 weeks for 
mothers without such mandated benefits. Among leave-takers, the 
duration of maternity leave is 9.341 and 8.477 for those with and 
without family leave legislation, respectively. 
TABLE 2: SAMPLE MEANS 
Dependant Variable Full Sample With Leave 
Without 
Leave 
 Took Maternity Leave 0.386 (0.487) 0.449 0.377 
 Weeks of Leave Taken 3.331 (5.313) 4.197 3.197 
 Leave Taken by Leavers 8.611 (5.245) 9.341 8.477 
 Observations 2877  385 2492 
   Eligible Women 
Ineligible 
Women 
 Took Maternity Leave   0.677 0.366 
 Weeks of Leave Taken   6.333 3.120 
 
 46. Table 2 presents these variables’ averages and standard deviations, as well as their 
descriptive statistics for subsamples of mothers who gave birth with and without family leave 
legislation in force. 
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Dependant Variable Full Sample With Leave 
Without 
Leave 
 Leave Taken by Leavers   9.351 8.515 
 Observations   189 2688 
   Covered Firms 
Firms Not 
Covered 
 Took Maternity Leave   0.673 0.556 
 Weeks of Leave Taken   6.918 4.703 
 Leave Taken by Leavers   10.272 8.452 
 Observations   147 1567 
   
Eligible and 
Covered 
Not Eligible 
and 
Covered 
 Took Maternity Leave   0.757 0.554 
 Weeks of Leave Taken   7.646 4.725 
 Leave Taken by Leavers   10.093 8.516 
 Observations   99 1615 
 
Explanatory Variables Full Sample With Leave
Without 
Leave 
 Black ( = 1 if black) 0.242 (0.428) 0.101 0.264 
 Hispanic ( = 1 if Hispanic) 0.190 (0.392) 0.174 0.193 
 Age (in years) 27.993 (2.670) 28.911 27.851 
 Education Level (years of schooling) 12.836 (2.372) 12.833 12.837 
 Marital Status ( = 1 if married) 0.744 (0.436) 0.794 0.736 
 Children ( = number of children) 1.724 (1.206) 1.654 1.735 
 Experience (in weeks) 344.575 (185.29) 416.779 333.420 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Also included in the analysis but not 
presented here are state dummy variables and year-specific dummy variables. 
The key variable of interest is the family leave legislation 
variable, which equals the weeks of leave the mandates guarantee. If 
a mother gives birth in a state with no family leave legislation or lives 
in a state at a time before that state’s legislation was in force, then the 
family leave legislation variable equals zero. Of the 2,877 mothers 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/5
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used in my analysis, 385 had government-mandated family leave and 
2,492 did not.  
To acquire family leave benefits, mothers may leave their state of 
residence to work in bordering states with government-mandated 
family leave in force. If border crossing occurs, then the effect of 
family leave legislation in the state of residence will be biased toward 
zero. Fortunately, the NLSY also identifies county of residence.47 
Therefore, I was able to account for the effects of border crossing, by 
re-estimating the models in three ways. First, I included a border 
dummy variable in the model that equaled one if the mother resided 
in a county that borders another state. Second, I averaged the length 
of leave mandated by the state of residence family leave legislation 
with the maximum family leave mandated from neighboring states, 
where a neighboring state is one that borders the mother’s county of 
residence. Third, I specified family leave mandates to equal the most 
generous mandates among the state of residence and neighboring 
states, if a bordering state existed as defined above.  
The family leave legislation variable does not account for whether 
the mother has the tenure to be eligible for leave or whether her 
employer is of sufficient size to be covered, because these potentially 
depend on previous employment decisions—whether and where to 
work prior to giving birth. If such decisions are determined by the 
same factors as leave-taking, then eligibility and employer coverage 
are endogenous. Instead, the family leave legislation variable serves 
as an instrument for eligibility and coverage because it exogenously 
assigns mothers mandated family leave based on state of residence.  
For comparison purposes, I created three additional family leave 
legislation variables to pick up the effect of the mandates on mothers 
who were eligible for the benefits and/or who worked for covered 
employers. The first of these additional variables identified whether 
the mother was eligible for mandated family leave benefits. 
Specifically, this variable equals the weeks of mandated leave if the 
mother gives birth in a state with family leave legislation and if the 
mother has the work history required to be eligible.48 Shown in Table 
 47. NLSY79 USER’S GUIDE, supra note 12, at 156. 
 48. Table 1 lists the tenure required to be eligible for each state’s leave mandate. 
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2, of the 385 mothers who give birth in states with family leave 
legislation in force, 189 had the tenure required to be eligible.  
The second additional family leave legislation variable identified 
whether the mother was employed by an employer covered by the 
mandates. In particular, this variable equals the weeks of mandated 
leave if the mother gives birth in a state with family leave legislation 
and if she worked for an employer who employed at least the 
minimum number of workers to be covered by the legislation. It is 
possible to determine employer coverage status for most mothers 
because the NLSY asks respondents for the number of employees 
who work for their current employer at the time of the survey.49 
Unfortunately, employer size is unknown for those mothers who 
worked for an employer who was not the “current employer” at the 
time of the survey. Of the 385 mothers who gave birth in states with 
family leave legislation in force, 147 are known to be covered.  
The third additional family leave legislation variable is a variant 
of the first two—it equals the weeks of leave mandated for mothers 
who gave birth in states with family leave legislation in force who 
were eligible and worked for covered employers. Only ninty-nine 
mothers were eligible and known to be covered. Table 2 shows that 
eligible mothers are more likely to take maternity leave from work 
after giving birth and to take more weeks of leave. The same is true 
for mothers who work for covered employers and for mothers who 
are both eligible and covered. When I estimated the effect of family 
leave legislation for mothers who were eligible and/or worked for 
covered employers, I also included covariates to control for tenure 
and/or firm size. Otherwise, the family leave legislation variable 
would serve as a proxy for the effects of the legislation and the effect 
of tenure and/or firm size. 
In addition to the state and year dummy variables described in 
Part III, I included a set of demographic characteristics variables to 
control for race (with black and Hispanic dummy variables), age, 
education, martial status, children present in the household, and 
weeks of work experience.50 Mothers who lived in states with family 
 49. NLSY79 USER’S GUIDE, supra note 12, at 156. Table 1 lists the firm size required to 
be covered by each state’s leave mandate. 
 50. Table 2 also presents descriptive statistics for the demographic variables and 
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leave legislation were less likely to be black and Hispanic, were 
older, were more likely to be married, and have fewer children. 
Mothers with family leave mandates also had substantially more 
work experience.  
V. RESULTS 
First, I estimated the effects of family leave legislation on the 
incidence of leave-taking and on the amount of leave taken. The 
family leave legislation-related results from these models are 
presented in Table 3. Then, I re-estimated the models using the 
various methods to control for potential border crossing. The relevant 
results from these models are also presented in Table 3. Next, I re-
estimated the models identifying mother eligibility and employer 
coverage. Results from these models are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  
The effect of family leave legislation on the probability of taking 
maternity leave after giving birth (Model 1) is small and statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, the effect of mandated family leave on the 
weeks of leave taken including zero values for mothers who take no 
leave (Model 2) is statistically insignificant. The legislation’s effect 
on weeks of leave taken among leave-takers is also not statistically 
different from zero. While the descriptive statistics indicate that 
government-mandated family leave benefits and leave-taking are 
positively associated, the multivariate regression results suggest that 
family leave legislation has no effect on leave-taking. In models not 
shown, the positive associations of family leave legislation on leave-
taking appear due to state-specific effects and time trends. That is, 
when state and year dummy variables are added to the regressions, 
positive effects of the legislation disappear. 
descriptive statistics for subsamples of mothers in states with and without family leave 
legislation in force. 
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TABLE 3: THE EFFECT OF FAMILY LEAVE LEGISLATION ON WEEKS 
OF MATERNITY LEAVE TAKEN 
  
Model 1: Took 
Maternity Leave 
Model 2: Weeks 
of Leave Taken
Model 3: Leave 
Taken by Leavers
Specification 1:       
Weeks of Mandated 
Family Leave -0.001 (0.017) 0.014 (0.034) -0.019 (0.057) 
Specification 2:       
Weeks of Mandated 
Family Leave 0.001 (0.017) 0.014 (0.034) -0.019 (0.057) 
State Border Dummy 
Variable -0.062 (0.121) 0.083 (0.229) 0.330 (0.392) 
Specification 3:       
Average Weeks of 
Mandated Family Leave 0.002 (0.019) 0.015 (0.037) -0.026 (0.062) 
Specification 4:       
Maximum Weeks of 
Mandated Family Leave -0.001 (0.014) 0.001 (0.027) -0.021 (0.048) 
The dependent variable in the “took maternity leave” model is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the mother took maternity leave from work. The dependent 
variable in the “weeks of leave taken” model is equal to the number of weeks of 
maternity leave taken from work including zero values. The dependent variable in 
the “leave taken by leavers” model is the number of weeks of maternity leave taken 
by those who took a positive amount of maternity leave from work. *indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 2,877 observations used in Models 1 
and 2 and 1,113 in Model 3. R-squared values are 0.242 for Model 1, 0.206 for 
Model 2, and range from 0.138 to 0.139 for Model 3 (depending on the 
specification). All models contain the demographic covariates as well as state and 
year dummy variables. 
These results may be biased due to border crossing. To investigate 
this possibility, I re-estimated the models (Models 1 through 3) 
controlling for living on a state border with a border dummy variable 
(Specification 2). However, the results were virtually unchanged: 
Family leave legislation continues to have a statistically insignificant 
effect, as does the effect of living in a county that borders another 
state. Specification 3 re-estimated the model using the average weeks 
of leave mandated by family leave legislation. That is, it reflected the 
average weeks mandated among the state of residence and bordering 
states, if any. The results were, again, left substantively unchanged: 
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The family leave legislation variable does not have a statistically 
significant effect in any of the models. The same occurs in 
Specification 4, which used the maximum weeks of mandated family 
leave among the state of residence and any border states. These 
results suggest that border crossing does not have a substantive effect 
on the estimates. 
It is possible that the family leave legislation variables appear to 
have no effect on leave-taking because they incorrectly assign 
ineligible (or uncovered) mothers weeks of mandated family leave. 
Therefore, I re-estimated the models identifying those mothers who 
were eligible for the legislation (Specification 5). The results again 
indicate that family leave legislation does not significantly impact the 
incidence of leave-taking or the amount of leave taken among 
mothers eligible for the mandated leave from work. However, when I 
identified the effect of mandated family leave among mothers 
employed in covered firms (Specification 6), the legislation had a 
statistically significant, positive effect on the duration of leave taken. 
According to the results in Model 2, increasing the weeks of 
mandated family leave from, for example, zero to twelve, increases 
the number of weeks of leave taken by 1.116 weeks. Further, 
increasing mandated family leave by the same amount in Model 3 
increases the amount of leave taken among leave-takers by 1.704 
weeks. Although these are small effects, they are statistically 
significant. However, since the family leave legislation variable has 
no effect in Model 1, there is still no evidence that such leave 
changes the number of mothers who take maternity leave. 
Specification 7 identified the effect of family leave legislation among 
eligible mothers who worked for covered employers, and the family 
leave legislation variable again had effects that were not statistically 
different from zero. 
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TABLE 4: THE EFFECT OF FAMILY LEAVE LEGISLATION ON 
WEEKS OF MATERNITY LEAVE TAKEN 
  
Model 1: Took 
Maternity Leave 
Model 2: Weeks 
of Leave Taken
Model 3: Leave 
Taken by Leavers
Specification 5:       
Weeks of Mandated Family 
Leave (eligible women) -0.001 (0.021) 0.017 (0.045) -0.036 (0.060)
 R-Squared 0.332  0.254  0.144  
 Observations 2,877  2,877  1,113  
Specification 6:       
Weeks of Mandated Family 
Leave (covered employers) -0.002 (0.024) 0.093* (0.055) 0.142** (0.068)
 R-Squared 0.162  0.181  0.157  
 Observations 1,714  1,714  971  
Specification 7:       
Weeks of Mandated Family 
Leave (eligible and covered) 0.008 (0.032) 0.087 (0.065) 0.095 (0.068)
 R-Squared 0.216  0.205  0.157  
 Observations 1,714  1,714  971  
The dependent variable in the “took maternity leave” model is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the mother took maternity leave from work. The dependent 
variable in the “weeks of leave taken” model is equal to the number of weeks of 
maternity leave taken from work including zero values. The dependent variable in 
the “leave taken by leavers” model is the number of weeks of maternity leave taken 
by those who took a positive amount of maternity leave from work. *indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models contain the demographic covariates as 
well as state and year dummy variables. In addition, Specification 5 controls for 
tenure, specification 6 controls for number of employees, and Specification 7 
controls for tenure and number of employees. 
Table 5 presents results from models that re-estimated 
Specifications 5, 6, and 7 as Specifications 8, 9, and 10, including the 
state-year interactions terms. These specifications are difference-in-
difference-in-differences (DDD) models because they control for 
state-specific time trends. Consequently, they represent the best 
attempt at identifying the true effect of family leave legislation.  
The results are similar to those displayed in Table 4, suggesting 
that those estimates were not biased by state time trends. For 
example, the effect of family leave legislation among eligible 
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mothers (Specification 8) is still statistically insignificant. However, 
identifying the legislation’s effect among mothers who work for 
covered employers (Specification 9) produces statistically significant 
effects: Increasing mandated family leave by twelve weeks increases 
maternity leave taken by 1.584 weeks in Model 2 and by 3.084 weeks 
in Model 3. Specification 10, which identifies the effects of family 
leave legislation on eligible and covered mothers, also shows that the 
legislation increases the weeks of leave taken by leave-takers. 
However, none of the specifications suggest that family leave 
legislation increases the incidence of leave-taking. Instead, the 
legislation’s only positive effects are that mothers who would have 
taken leave prior to the mandates take an additional week or two of 
leave. 
TABLE 5: THE EFFECT OF FAMILY LEAVE LEGISLATION ON 
WEEKS OF MATERNITY LEAVE TAKEN 
  
Model 1: Took 
Maternity Leave 
Model 2: Weeks 
of Leave Taken
Model 3: Leave 
Taken by Leavers
Specification 8:       
Weeks of Mandated 
Family Leave (eligible 
women) -0.026 (0.029) 0.002 (0.052) -0.042 (0.103)
 R-Squared 0.368  0.302  0.287  
 Observations 2,877  2,877  1,113  
Specification 9:       
Weeks of Mandated 
Family Leave (covered 
employers) 0.005 (0.031) 0.132* (0.076) 0.257** (0.110)
 R-Squared 0.206  0.263  0.316  
 Observations 1,714  1,714  971  
Specification 10:       
Weeks of Mandated 
Family Leave (eligible and 
covered) 0.001 (0.040) 0.081 (0.083) 0.161* (0.086)
 R-Squared 0.261  0.285  0.313  
 Observations 1,714  1,714  971  
The dependent variable in the “took maternity leave” model is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the mother took maternity leave from work. The dependent 
variable in the “weeks of leave taken” model is equal to the number of weeks of 
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maternity leave taken from work including zero values. The dependent variable in 
the “leave taken by leavers” model is the number of weeks of maternity leave taken 
by those who took a positive amount of maternity leave from work. *indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models contain the demographic covariates, 
state and year dummy variables, and state-year interaction terms. In addition, 
Specification 8 controls for tenure, Specification 9 controls for number of 
employees, and Specification 10 controls for tenure and number of employees. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Family leave legislation has no effect on the incidence of leave-
taking in any of the models. Similarly, most of the models in this 
Article provide no evidence that family leave legislation affects the 
amount of leave taken in either the full sample or among leave-takers. 
However, those models that identify mothers who work for 
employers covered by the mandates produce some statistically 
significant results. Regardless, even where statistically significant, 
family leave legislation has very small effects on leave-taking. For 
example, the legislation’s largest effect is in Specification 9 (Model 
3) where increasing family leave legislation by twelve weeks 
increases weeks of leave taken among leave-takers by about three 
weeks. The increases in leave-taking in the other models with 
significant effects are less than two weeks. 
The small effects of family leave legislation on leave-taking found 
in this paper are consistent with the small or nonexistent effects of the 
legislation on other outcomes found in the literature. Recall that in 
their preferred specifications, Klerman & Leibowitz51 and Baum52 
found no effects on employment, Klerman & Leibowitz found no 
effects on work, and Baum53 and Waldfogel54 found no effects on 
wages. Even the significant effects of the legislation on returning to 
work at the pre-childbirth job that Baum55 found are small.  
One potential explanation for the legislation’s small effect is that 
many mothers cannot afford to take the leave the mandates provides 
 51. Klerman & Leibowitz, supra note 4, at 82. 
 52. Employment and Wages, supra note 14. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Waldfogel, supra note 14, at 296–99. 
 55. Mother’s Labor Supply, supra note 14. 
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because it is unpaid. Thus, financial constraints may be more binding 
than employer constraints on the amount of leave allowed. 
Alternatively, only a portion of employers are covered by the 
mandates, and those who are covered may have been likely to 
provide sufficient family leave prior to the mandates. If so, then 
family leave legislation may not have changed many existing leave 
policies.  
Other explanations have to do with technical limitations. If the 
legislation indeed has small effects, then a substantially larger data 
set may be required to detect significant effects. Unfortunately, the 
sample sizes used in this paper were small, and the size of the 
treatment group becomes even smaller when identifying those 
mothers who are eligible and covered by the mandates. This is a 
problem that is systemic to the literature, as indicated by the fact that 
Klerman & Leibowitz,56 Waldfogel,57 and Baum58 used samples that 
were of comparable sizes. However, I should note that the family 
leave legislation variable’s estimated standard errors are typically less 
than 0.100 (see Tables 3, 4, and 5). Consequently, these models have 
the explanatory power to reject marginal effects of roughly 0.200 at 
the ninety-five percent level. That is, with a standard error of 0.100, 
the estimates are precise enough to test whether mandating twelve 
weeks of family leave increases weeks of leave taken by 2.4 or more 
weeks.  
Another technical limitation of this study is that NLSY work 
history data is collected retroactively and may, consequently, be 
inaccurate due to recall error.59 This is important because the leave-
taking variables are derived by adding the weeks of maternity leave 
that each mother reports after giving birth. Certainly the mother 
should clearly recall her child’s date of birth, but she may not recall 
exactly how much time she took off from work. This problem should 
be mitigated by the NLSY surveying respondents annually—mothers 
should be surveyed no more than a year after giving birth.  
 56. Klerman & Leibowitz, supra note 4. 
 57. Waldfogel, supra note 14. 
 58. Mother’s Labor Supply, supra note 14; Employment and Wages, supra note 14. 
 59. NLSY79 USER’S GUIDE, supra note 12. 
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While it is not clear from this Article precisely why family leave 
legislation has little effect on leave-taking, this Article provides the 
best available estimates on this outcome because it is the only study 
to examine leave-taking while accounting for mothers’ eligibility 
status and employer coverage. In conjunction with other estimates in 
the literature, I conclude that the current mandates have had little 
effect. However, the estimates in this Article cannot address the 
effects of mandating significantly longer periods of leave or 
mandating paid leave because no mother in my sample receives more 
than seventeen weeks of unpaid leave. It is possible that such 
extensions would have significantly larger effects.  
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